We design two computationally-efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentive-compatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation. The first mechanism obtains an O( √ m)-approximation of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations -this is the best approximation possible in polynomial time. The second one obtains an O(log 2 m)-approximation for a subclass of bidder valuations that includes all submodular bidders. This improves over the best previously obtained incentivecompatible mechanism for this class which only provides an O( √ m)-approximation.
INTRODUCTION

Background
The field of Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to design efficient mechanisms for decentralized computerized settings. These mechanisms must take into account both the strategic behavior of the different participants and the usual algorithmic efficiency considerations. Target applications include many types of protocols for Internet environment that necessitate looking at both issues -strategic and algorithmic -together. For an introduction see [20] .
The basic strategic notions are taken from the field of mechanism design -a subfield of economic theory (see [18, 23] ), and in most of the work in computational settings, as in this one, the very robust notion of equilibrium in dominant strategies is used. It is well known ( [18] , see [20] ) that without loss of generality, we can limit ourselves to looking at "incentive compatible" mechanisms, also known as "truthful" mechanisms or "strategy-proof" mechanisms. In such mechanisms participants are always rationally motivated to correctly report their private information.
The main difficulty in this field is the fact that the basic technique of mechanism design -namely VCG mechanisms [25, 4, 11] -can only be applied in cases where the exact optimal outcome is achieved. However, in most interesting computational applications, exact optimization is NP-hard, and computationally-speaking we must settle for approximations or heuristics. As was observed in [20, 17] , the VCG technique cannot be applied in such cases, and in fact [21] showed that this inapplicability was essentially universal. Thus, the challenge is to design alternative incentivecompatible mechanisms for interesting applications.
The problem of combinatorial auctions has gained the status of the paradigmatic problem of this field. For a thorough overview see [5] . In a combinatorial auction, m items are auctioned to n players. Each player i has a valuation function vi that describes his value vi(S) for each subset S of items. The basic question is how to construct the auction mechanism that allocates all the items in a way that maximizes the social welfare Σivi(Si) where Si is the set of items allocated to bidder i. This problem indeed exhibits the basic issues of algorithmic mechanism design: finding the exact optimum is computationally hard, even for the most interesting special cases, but several approximation algorithms, with varying approximation ratios, are known for the general case as well as for various interesting special cases [16, 6, 7, 8] . However, these approximation algorithms do not yield incentive compatible mechanisms.
In a landmark paper, Lehmann et al [17] were able to design an incentive-compatible, efficiently-computable, approximation mechanism -which achieves an approximation ratio that is as good as computationally possible Θ( √ m) [24] -for the special case of "single-minded bidders". This is the case in which each bidder is only interested in a single bundle of goods. For this special case, as well as some other singleparameter scenarios a host of incentive compatible mechanisms have been designed in the last few years (e.g., [19, 1, 10, 9] ). However, almost nothing is known for more general cases in which bidders have complex multi-dimensional pref-erences. Only two results are known in multi-dimensional settings 1 : the first is a pair of algorithms that completely optimize over a very restricted range of allocations and then use the usual VCG mechanism. These get a barely better than trivial approximation ratio of O(m/ √ log m) for the general case [12] and a weak O( √ m) for the "complementfree" case [6] -both ratios being quite far from what is computationally possible. The second result is the mechanism of [2] that applies only to the special case of auctions with many duplicates of each good and indeed is not a VCG mechanism. Some evidence showing that obtaining a non-VCG incentive-compatible mechanism for combinatorial auctions and related problems would be difficult was given in [14] .
Randomized Mechanisms
It was observed in [20] that randomized mechanisms can sometimes provide better approximation ratios than deterministic ones. There are two possible definitions for incentive compatibility of a randomized mechanism. The first and stronger one, defines an incentive-compatible randomized mechanism as a probability distribution over incentive compatible deterministic mechanisms. Thus, this definition requires that for any fixed outcome of the random choices made by the mechanism, players still maximize their utility by reporting their true valuations. This definition was used in [20, 10, 9] , and will be called incentive compatible in the universal sense. The weaker definition only requires that players maximize their expected utility, where the expectation is over the random choices of the mechanism (but still for every behavior of the other players). This was used in [15, 8] (see below), and will be called incentive compatibility in expectation.
There are two major implications of the difference between these two notions:
1. Attitude towards risk: randomized mechanisms that are incentive compatible in expectation only motivate risk-neutral bidders to act truthfully. Risk-averse bidders may benefit from strategic behavior. In contrast, the universal sense of incentive compatibility applies to any attitude towards risk, as it applies to every possible realization of the random coins.
2. Knowledge of the randomization results: randomized mechanisms that are incentive compatible in expectation induce truthful behavior only as long as players have no information about the outcomes of the random coin flips before they need to act. Thus, in order to ensure truthful behavior the mechanism must utilize cryptography-grade randomness, and keep it secret from the players. In contrast, any randomization that is effective algorithmically suffices to ensure truthful behavior in the universal case. (In a similar vein, technically speaking, using a pseudorandom generator will destroy the formal incentive compatibility properties of randomized mechanisms that are incentive compatible in expectation, due to the slight -subpolynomial -change in probabilities of outcomes.)
In the recent [15] a rather general technique was developed for converting approximation algorithms into random-ized mechanisms that are incentive compatible in expectation. The technique is based on randomized rounding of the LP relaxation, and relies on a clever representation of the LP solution as a scaled convex combination of integer solutions. In particular, they design a randomized mechanism for general combinatorial auctions that is incentive compatible in expectation and obtains the computationally-optimal approximation ratio of O( √ m). Very recently, [8] used a different but somewhat related randomized rounding procedure to obtain another randomized mechanism for the case of combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. This mechanism is, again, incentive-compatible in expectation, and achieves an approximation ratio of O( log m log log m ), which is worse than what he obtains algorithmically -a ratio of 2.
Our Results
We present the first randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions that is incentive compatible is the universal sense. This is another step towards the "holy grail" of obtaining a deterministic one.
Theorem: There exists a polynomial-time computable randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with general bidders that is incentive compatible in the universal sense and obtains a O( √ m) approximation ratio.
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The algorithm runs in time that is polynomial in the natural parameters of the problem: the number of players n and the number of items m. Access to the (exponentially long) valuation functions of the players is done using the usual demand queries [3, 6, 7] , in which bidders are presented with a vector of item prices p1...pm and reply with the set of items S that maximizes their utility under these prices v(S)− È j∈S pj. The approximation factor mentioned in the theorem is in expectation, however, our result is technically stronger: for any fixed > 0 we provide a mechanism that obtains √ m poly( ) -approximation with probability of at least 1 − .
Our techniques are quite simple, completely different than the methods of [15, 8] , and do not rely on the LP-relaxation of the problem. They are more in line with the random sampling methods that were used for auctioning "digital goods" [10, 9] . These techniques can be viewed as providing a general framework for obtaining randomized incentive compatible mechanisms in the universal sense. In particular, a significant property of this framework is that it provides, for any > 0, a mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio not just in expectation, but with probability 1 − . We stress that this cannot be achieved by the usual techniques of amplification, since repetition can destroy the incentive properties. Using the same framework, we are also able to design improved mechanisms for the important special case of submodular valuations, and actually even for a more general class of valuations termed "XOS" in [16] and "fractionally-subadditive" in [8] 3 . This improves over the truthful deterministic O( √ m)-approximation achieved in [6] .
Theorem: There exists a polynomial-time computable randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders that is incentive compatible in the universal sense and obtains a O(log 2 m) approximation ratio.
Beyond the use of randomization, this theorem is suboptimal in two other senses, which remain as open problems: first, the approximation ratio achieved is worse than the ratio of e e−1 that is computationally possible [7] ; second, our mechanism does not apply to the somewhat wider class of complement-free valuations that is handled in [8, 6] .
The major open problem left is that of finding deterministic O( √ m)-approximation efficiently-computable incentivecompatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions.
PRELIMINARIES
In a combinatorial auction, a set M of items, M = {1, ..., m}, is sold to n bidders. Every bidder values bundles of items, rather than only assigning values to single items. The value that bidder i assigns to bundle S is defined by a valuation function vi : 2 M → R + . Two standard assumptions regarding each bidder i, are that vi is normalized (vi(∅) = 0), and
The allocation problem is to partition the items between the bidders in a way that maximizes the "total social welfare". I.e., to find a partition S1, ..., Sn of M , that maximizes Σivi(Si).
Even though the size of the "input" is exponential in m (each vi is described by 2 m real numbers) we require algorithms to run in time polynomial in the natural parameters of the problem, m and n. An important issue is how the input can be accessed. In this paper we follow the "black box" approach: we assume that we are given an oracle for each valuation function. The oracle is limited to some predefined type of queries. A common type of query is the demand query (e.g., [6, 7, 3] ). A demand query to a valuation vi specifies a vector p = (p1...pm) of "item prices". The answer to the query is a set that would be "demanded" by the queried bidder under these item prices. I.e., a subset S that maximizes vi(S) − È j∈S pj. In this paper we seek algorithms that are incentive compatible (a.k.a. truthful). That is, algorithms which ensure that it is in the best interest of each of the bidders to always reveal his true preferences when asked. In the case of randomized mechanisms this translates to being incentive compatible in the universal sense -randomized mechanisms that are a probability distribution over incentive compatible deterministic mechanisms. In other words, telling the truth is the dominant strategy of each bidder, regardless of the coins tossed by the mechanism. This is a much stronger requirement than incentive compatibility in expectation (see [15] ).
Some special cases of combinatorial auctions have recently received great attention. In particular, combinatorial auctions in which all bidders are known to have submodular valuations are the subject of extensive research (e.g., [16, 6, 13, 7] 
All submodular valuations are known to be strictly contained in the more general class of valuations termed "XOS" in [16] , and "fractionally-subadditive" in [8] . A valuation v is said to be XOS if there are additive valuations {a1, ..., at}, such that
See [7] for a more thorough explanation. For every XOS valuation v = max k {a k }, and bundle S, we call an additive valuation a such that a(S) = arg max k {a k (S)} a maximizing clause for S in vi. We require XOS bidders to be able to answer XOS queries. In this type of queries the question is in the form of a bundle and the answer is a maximizing clause for that bundle.
A FRAMEWORK FOR DESIGNING INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS
The design of a randomized approximation algorithm comprises two basic steps: first, we are interested in making sure that the expected value of the solution produced by the algorithm is "not far" from the optimum. Second, we wish to be able to find a solution with a value "close" to the expectation with high probability. Usually, the main difficulty is in achieving the first goal and proving that a solution close to the expectation can be obtained with some (perhaps polynomially low) probability. Amplification of the probability of success is then easily attainable by running the algorithm a polynomial number of times and choosing the best solution.
In contrast, the design of a randomized mechanism is inherently different: in general, running a mechanism multiple times and choosing the best output does not preserve the truthfulness of the mechanism. In addition, it is well known that in order to ensure truthfulness, the price a bidder pays for the bundle he is allocated cannot depend on information he provides. The framework we introduce here helps us overcome these problems.
The framework relies on the examination of two distinct possible cases: either there is one bidder such that allocating all items to him is a good approximation to the welfare, or there is no such bidder. I.e., there is no "small" group of bidders that contributes "a lot" to the optimal solution. In the first case, achieving a good approximation is easy -allocate all items to that bidder. In the second and more complicated case, we will perform a fixed-price auction, and will have to prove that we get a good approximation. The key observation used in handling the second case is that two randomly chosen groups that consist (in expectation) of a constant fraction of the bidders have many properties in common (e.g., both hold a constant fraction of the total welfare.) This idea is similar to the main principle in random-sampling auctions for "digital goods" [10, 9] . However, our situation is much more complex due to the multi-parameter setting of combinatorial auctions, in contrast to the single-parameter setting of [10, 9] . In addition, our goal is to optimize the welfare, and not maximize revenue. Moreover, we do not assume that all the items are identical and that there is an unlimited supply of items, as in the case of "digital goods". From a computational point of view, another difference is that the problems we consider are NP-hard to approximate.
The framework allows us, with high probability, to distinguish between the two cases, and provides us with the tools for finding the price used in the fixed-price auction. The main difficulty in tailoring the framework to a specific setting is showing that the fixed-price auction guarantees a good approximation. Indeed, in the two mechanisms we are about to present in this paper the price used in the fixed-price auction is determined in a completely different manner.
The Framework:
Phase I: Partitioning the Bidders
We assign each bidder to exactly one of the following three sets: SEC-PRICE with probability 1 − , FIXED with probability 2 , and STAT with probability 2 . Only bidders from SEC-PRICE will be allowed to participate in the second-price auction. Bidders in STAT will never get any items, so we can safely use this group to gather the necessary statistics (see next phase). The bidders in FIXED will be the only bidders who participate in the fixed-price auction.
Phase II: Gathering Statistics
The goal in this phase is to use the bidders in STAT in order to find prices for the second-price auction with reserve price, and the fixed-price auction. Both auctions will be conducted in the next phases. To ensure incentive compatibility, a bidder should have no influence on the price of the bundle he is offered. This is why the prices of bundles offered to bidders in SEC-PRICE and FIXED in the following phases will be determined using bidders in STAT only. The bidders in STAT never get any items and so have no incentive to misreport their preferences.
Finding the price of the fixed-price auction is mechanism specific. However, the reserve price for the second price auction is generally determined by applying an approximation algorithm to bidders from STAT. If no small groups of bidders contributes a large fraction of the optimal solution (the first case), we can prove that with high probability the reserve price we obtain is a good approximation to the optimal welfare. On the other hand, If there is one bidder with very high value for the bundle of all items (the second case), we will see that this reserve price has no effect on the result of the second-price auction.
Phase III: A Second-Price Auction
We now conduct a second-price auction with a reserve price for selling the bundle of all items to one of the bidders. Intuitively, one can think of this phase as handling the first case, where there is one bidder with a very high value for the bundle of all items. A secondprice auction will allocate the bundle of all items to the bidder that values it the most. If there is one bidder with a very high value for this bundle, he will be placed in SEC-PRICE with probability 1 − . We then get a good approximation to the welfare, and the algorithm terminates.
The purpose of the reserve price is to handle the second case, where no small group of bidders contributes a lot to the optimal solution 5 . If this is the situation, allocating all items to one bidder may provide a bad approximation. Fortunately, in the previous phase we obtained a reserve price which is a good approximation to the optimal welfare. Therefore, if there is a "winning bidder", we know that we have a good approximation because the revenue obtained in the second-price auction (which is at least the reserve price) is a lower bound on the welfare. If we do not have a winning bidder, we continue to the next phase.
Phase IV: A Fixed-Price Auction
We go over the bidders in FIXED one by one, in some arbitrary order, asking each one for his demand under a fixed price per item, obtained earlier from the bidders in STAT. We allocate each bidder his most demanded set, and charge him the appropriate price. We remove the set allocated to him from the set of items that are offered to the next bidders.
This phase is meant to handle the second case, where no small group of bidders contributes a lot to the optimal solution. Indeed, it can be shown that since FIXED is a randomly chosen group that consists of a constant fraction of all bidders, it also holds, with high probability, a constant fraction of the optimal welfare. In addition, we show that in the second case the bidders in STAT aid us in choosing a fixed-price that leads to a good approximation. The way this price is chosen is mechanism-specific, and is not the same in our two mechanisms.
For every possible tosses of coins the framework produces a truthful deterministic mechanism. First, bidders who are in STAT never get any items, and thus have no incentive to misreport their preferences. A bidder can get items in exactly one of the following ways: by participating in the second-price auction with the reserve price, or by participating in the fixed-price auction.
It is well known that second-price auctions with a reserve price are incentive compatible. The fixed-price auction is also clearly incentive compatible, as each bidder gets the bundle that maximizes his demand, given prices which he does not affect.
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS WITH GENERAL VALUATIONS
In this section we exhibit an incentive-compatible mechanism for approximating combinatorial auctions with general valuations. The incentive compatibility of the mechanism is guaranteed by its use of the framework. As in all mechanisms built using the framework, the main difficulty is to analyze the case in which no "small" group of bidders contributes "a lot" to the optimal solution. In the case of general valuations this is translated to the case where no bidder assigns a value to M that is higher than the √ m-fraction of the value of the optimal fractional solution.
In this case, our mechanism uses the bidders of STAT to approximate the value of the optimal fractional solution. We set the item price for the fixed-price auction to be (approximately) the value of the approximation we obtained, divided by the number of items. The important technical observation is that for each item we manage to sell at this price, we "lose" a value of at most O( √ m) times this price (compared to the optimal fractional solution). The revenue we get in this case sets a lower bound on the welfare we achieve.
Although the mechanism does use the LP relaxation of the problem, LP does play a relatively minor role, and we mainly use it for the analysis. This is in contrast to previous related work [15, 8] , where the technique itself is LP based. The reader is referred to the appendix for the standard LP relaxation of the problem.
The Algorithm:
Input: n bidders 6 , each with a general valuation vi that is represented by a demand oracle, a rational number 0 < < 1.
Output: An allocation of the items, which is a O( √ m
3 )-approximation to the optimal allocation.
The Algorithm:
Phase I: Partitioning the Bidders 1. Assign each bidder to exactly one of the following three sets: SEC-PRICE with probability 1 − , FIXED with probability 2 , and STAT with probability 2 .
Phase II: Gathering Statistics 3 )-approximation with probability 1 − . Proof. The algorithm produces a feasible allocation. In addition, the algorithm is clearly incentive compatible, since it was designed using the framework. It is left to prove that it obtains the desired approximation ratio with probability 1 − . 6 Both in this mechanism and in the XOS mechanism, we assume that n is not constant. If n is constant, one can easily get a truthful 
Hence, due to the properties of second-price auctions with a reserve price, all items will be sold to i , and the algorithm will terminate in Step 3. Thus, we get an allocation that is an O( √ m)-approximation to the optimal one.
The second case is more involved. For each bidder i,
. We will take advantage of the fact that no bidder contributes "a lot" to the optimal fractional solution, and see that, with high probability, OP T * ST AT is a good approximation to the optimal fractional solution. We will see that the same holds for OP T * F IXED , which is the value of the optimal fractional solutions in the combinatorial auctions with all m items and with bidders from FIXED only. 
Proof. We will start by proving that the probability that the first event does not occur is o(1). The proof for the second is almost identical. The lemma will then follow, by applying the union bound.
Let A be the random variable that receives the value of OP T * ST AT . For every bidder i we denote by Ai the random variable that receives the value of bidder i in OP T * ST AT . Let {xi,S} 1≤i≤n,S⊆M be the set of variables in the fractional solution, OP T * . Since every bidder is placed in STAT with probability 2 , and ST AT ⊆ N , we have that . We can use this fact to set an upper bound on the probability that A gets a value that is substantially smaller than its expectation. We make use of the following corollary from Chebyshev's inequality: Claim 4.4. Let X be the sum of independent random variables, each of which lies in [0, t] . Then, for any α > 0,
With probability of 1 − o(1) we have that the values of the optimal fractional solutions for FIXED and STAT are "close" to OP T * . If this is the case, we will show that we manage to achieve an O(
2 ) approximation factor. With probability of at most o(1) this is not the case, and the algorithm fails to provide any approximation ratio.
Although the second-price auction was designed to handle the first case, when there is one bidder that contributes "a lot" to the welfare, it is still possible that some bidder i in SEC-PRICE will be allocated the bundle M in Step 3. However, notice that bidder i was forced to pay at least 
For the item-price p it holds that:
Proof. Let {yi,S} i∈F IXED,S⊆M be the variables in the fractional solution OP T * F IXED . We will restrict our attention to bundles in OP T * F IXED that are profitable when setting a price of p for each item. That is, let T be the set of pairs (i, S) such that yi,S > 0, and vi(S) − p · |S| > 0. The next claim shows that we do not lose too much by ignoring all other bundles in OP T * F IXED . 
* it is enough to bound from above the contribution of T to OP T * F IXED to prove the claim.
where the first inequality is because of the definition of T and the second inequality is due to the LP constraints.
Let us now calculate the revenue we get in Step 5. Without loss of generality, assume the bidders in FIXED are 1, ..., 2 n. In the first iteration of Step 5, bidder 1 is asked for his most demanded set. The key observation is that if there is some S such that x1,S > 0 and (1, S) ∈ T then bidder 1's demand is not empty. Recall that for each item in S1 we gain a revenue of p.
We will now upper bound what we "lose" by assigning S1 to bidder 1 in comparison to OP T * F IXED . Notice, that by assigning S1 to bidder 1 we lose both the value of all the fractional bundles assigned to bidder 1 in OP T * F IXED , and of all the bundles in OP T * F IXED that contain some item from S1. The value of all the fractional bundles assigned to bidder 1 in OP T * F IXED is at most
and Σ (1,S) y1,S ≤ 1, due to the constraints of the LP formulation.
We will now bound the value of all the bundles in OP T * F IXED that contain some item from S1. Fix some item j ∈ S1. 3 ) approximation to OP T * , and the theorem follows.
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS WITH XOS VALUATIONS
Like the mechanism for approximating combinatorial auctions with general valuations, the mechanism for XOS valuations is also based on the general framework. Again, the main challenge involved in designing this mechanism is analyzing the case in which no "small" group of bidders contributes "a lot" to the optimal solution. The way this is achieved for XOS valuations is entirely different from the way it is done with general valuations.
Suppose we assign a bundle S to a bidder with an XOS valuation vi. By the definition of XOS valuations, v(S) is determined by the value S gets under some additive valuation a (we will also refer to a as the maximizing clause).
We can look at the whole process as implicitly assigning a "price" to each item in S (the price that a assigns to each item in S.) We will use this property for finding a price for the fixed-price auction. To see how this is done we must first introduce the following definition: We now show that for every allocation it is possible to find a "contained" allocation and a price that supports it, and holds a considerable part of the welfare of the original allocation.
Lemma 5.2. For every allocation T = (T1, ..., Tn) it is possible to find in polynomial time an allocation (S1, ..., Sn) and a price p that supports it, such that for each i, Si ⊆ Ti, and Σi|Si| · p ≥ Ω(
Proof. Given an allocation T , we query each bidder i's XOS oracle for the maximizing XOS clause for Ti. We refer to the value of an item in Ti as the item's value in the maximizing clause of Ti. Let W = Σivi(Ti) (i.e., the welfare value of T .) Define the set
Round down each item's value in the maximizing clauses to the nearest value in P . Let p ∈ P be the (rounded down) item value that "contributes the most" to the welfare. Notice that we ignore items with value lower than W 2m -our "loss" is not too high since the sum of these items' values is less than
. We can now define (S1, ..., Sn) to be the allocation in which Si ⊆ Ti and the (rounded down) value of every item in Ti is at least p.
There is still the matter of finding such a price that would enable us to get a good approximation in the fixed-price auction. We prove that one can use the bidders in STAT to find such a price for the bidders in FIXED with high probability.
We also note that if a valuation is known to be submodular, an XOS oracle for it can be simulated using a demand oracle [6] . Thus, if all bidders are known to be submodular our mechanism can be implemented using demand oracles only.
The Algorithm:
Input: n bidders, v1, ..., vn, each represented by a demand and a XOS oracle, a rational number 0 < < 1 2 .
Output: An allocation of the items, which is an O(
)-approximation to the optimal allocation.
Phase II: Gathering Statistics 2. Find an allocation that is an O(1) approximation to the value of the optimal solution in the combinatorial auction with all m items, but only with the bidders in STAT (e.g., using the algorithms of [6, 7] , in which the bundle M of all items is sold to the bidders in SEC-PRICE. If there is a "winning bidder", allocate all the items to that bidder and output this allocation. Otherwise, proceed to the next step. Proof. The algorithm produces a feasible allocation. Incentive compatibility of the algorithm is guaranteed since it was built using the framework. It is left to prove that it obtains the desired approximation ratio with probability 1 − .
We will now prove that the the algorithm provides the approximation ratio. Let R = . There are two possible cases:
1. There is a bidder i such that vi(M ) ≥ R.
For each bidder i, vi(M ) < R.
We handle the first case in a way similar to the way we handled the first case in the correctness proof for the algorithm of Section 4. Let i be some bidder such that vi(M ) ≥ R. Observe that with probability 1 − bidder i is in SEC-PRICE. If there is no such bidder is in SEC-PRICE, then the algorithm fails to guarantee any approximation ratio. This happens with probability of at most . If bidder i is in SEC-PRICE the algorithm obtains a R-approximation. The next proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2. Let us now examine the second case, where for each bidder i, vi(M ) < R. The basic idea is to use the bidders in STAT to find a price that, with high probability, will obtain an allocation of the items to the bidders in FIXED in Step 6. To show this we need to prove that OP TFIXED, the value of the optimal solution consisting of the bidders in FIXED only, has a value that is "close" to the value of the total welfare. This will be done in a similar way to the previous algorithm. However, unlike the previous algorithm, we have to prove that if a price is "good" in OP TFIXED (i.e. supports an allocation that holds a substantial part of the welfare), then it can be found using the bidders in STAT. As in Lemma 5.2, we restrict our attention to prices which are greater than 
Then the algorithm produces an allocation that is an O(
